UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-5-2008

State v. Bennett Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34066

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Bennett Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34066" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2409.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2409

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
WILLIAM LYNN BENNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 34066

FILED - COpy
JUt·! .;. 5 209B
Supreme Court _Court of Appeals_
Entered on ATS b y : _

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

HEATHER M. CARLSON
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings .................... 1
ISSUES ............................................................................................................4
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................5
I.

There Was Substantial Competent Evidence
Presented At Trial Upon Which The Jury Found
Bennett Guilty Of Grand Theft .................................................... 5
A.

Introduction ......................................................................5

B.

Standard Of Review ......................................................... 5

C.

There Was Substantial And Competent
Evidence Presented At Trial From Which The
Jury Reasonably Found Bennett Guilty Of Grand
Theft ................................................................................6
1.

The State Established Through Substantial
And Competent Evidence That Bennett
Wrongfully Took Mr. LeFave's Trailer ................... 8

2.

The State Established Through Substantial
And Competent Evidence That Bennett
Took The Trailer From An Owner ....................... 12

3.

The State Established Through Substantial
And Competent Evidence That Bennett
Took The Trailer With The Intent To
Permanently Deprive Mr. LeFave Of
The Trailer. .......................................................... 15

II.

Bennett's Argument That His Sentence Is Illegal Is
Not Preserved For Appeal ...... '" ............................................... 16

CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 17

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

State v. Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992) ..................... 16
State v. Erwin, 98 Idaho 736, 572 P.2d 170 (1977) .............................................. 7
State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 554 P.2d 944 (1976) ............................................ 7
State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 735 P.2d 1070 (Ct. App. 1987) ...................... 5, 6, 7
State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638,945 P.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997) ...... 8, 9,10,11
State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002) ......................... 16
State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698,946 P.2d 1338 (Ct. App. 1997) ........................ 6
State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972) ................................ 11, 12, 13
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991) .......................... 5
State v. Krommenhoek, 107 Idaho 188, 687 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1984) ............... 7
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992) ............................. 5

STATUTES
I.C. § 18-2402 ............................................................................................. passim
I.C. § 18-2403 ............................................................................................. passim
I.C. § 18-2407 ...................................................................................................... 6
I.C. § 28-2-401 ................................................................................................... 14
I.C. § 49-501 ........... :.......................................................................................... 13
I.C. § 49-503 ...................................................................................................... 13

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
William Lynn Bennett appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of grand theft claiming (1) the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction, and (2) his sentence is illegal.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
John LeFave owned a travel trailer, which he had appraised at $1,SOO.00
(Tr., p.24, L.9 - p.25, L.15; State's Exhibit 1.) In 2004, Mr. LeFave decided to
sell the trailer. (Tr., p.25, Ls.16-25.) Bennett responded to an advertisement for
the trailer and he and Mr. LeFave agreed on a purchase price of $1,500.00. (Tr.,
p.2S, Ls.S-22.) Pursuant to the agreement, Bennett was to pay some money
down and then they "would go from there and go to a finance company and get it
straightened out." (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-3.) In the meantime, Mr. LeFave agreed to
move the trailer to Bennett's friend, Carolynn Ellinger's, house; however, Mr.
LeFave "put a chain on it" and a "tongue hitch lock system" "[t]o keep it from
being moved" because Bennet! did not have permission to move it until he paid
for it. (Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.13, p.31, Ls.1-3, p.S2, L.16 - p.S3, L.14.) Mr.
LeFave specifically told Bennet! that if the trailer needed to be moved he would
move it "so [he] would know where it was at all times." (Tr., p.30, Ls.15-17.)
Mr. LeFave subsequently learned the trailer had been moved, without his
permission, and even though Bennett had made only one payment ' towards the

1 The single payment Mr. LeFave testified Bennett made was to Mrs. LeFave.
(Tr., p.64, Ls.7-S.) Mrs. LeFave could not recall precisely how much the payment
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$1;500.00 purchase price. (Tr., p.31, Ls.12-14, p.32, Ls.7-12, p.64, Ls.7-8, p.73,
L.1 - p.75, LA.) Mr. LeFave went to confirm whether the trailer had been moved
and discovered it was, in fact, missing and that the lock had been removed and
"part of the upper part of the lock system for the - - the tongue hitch" was left on
Ms. Ellinger's property. (Tr., p.32, Ls.21-25.)
A few months later, Bennett called Mr. LeFave. (Tr., p.33, Ls.5-9, pA5,
L. 19 - pA6, L.15.) Bennett told Mr. LeFave to send him the title and he would
send $1,000.00, but that if Mr. LeFave got the police involved, Bennett "would
burn [the trailer)." (Tr., p.34, Ls.1-3.) Mr. LeFave instead sent Bennett a certified
letter to the address provided by Bennett and advised Bennett he was going to
report the trailer as stolen and to contact the Boise Police Department if he had
any questions.

(Tr., p.34, L.24 - p.36, L.19, pA6, Ls.16-23, p.104, Ls.10-14;

State's Exhibits 2, 3.) The letter was, however, returned as undelivered. (Tr.,
p.36, L.20 - p.37, l,7.)
After his unsuccessful attempt to have Bennett return the trailer, Mr.
LeFave drove to Washington to the address he had for Bennett in an effort to find
his trailer. (Tr., p.37, Ls.8-15.) However, Mr. LeFave discovered Bennett was no
longer at the address Mr. LeFave had for him, nor was he able to find his trailer
at that particular location, which was a trailer court. (Tr., p.37, Ls. 16-21.) Mr.
LeFave thereafter reported the theft to law enforcement. (Tr., pA5, L.23 - pA6,
L.1.) Mr. LeFave's trailer has never been returned to him. (Tr., p.1 05, LsA-6.)

was. (Tr., p.74, Ls.7-8.) She thought it was "[b)etween 2- and $300" (Tr., p.74,
L.11) but admitted it could have been $400 (Tr., p.78, Ls.24-25). Although
Bennett claimed he made other payments, he testified that the payment he made
to Mrs. LeFave was $150. (Tr., p. 101, Ls.10-25.)
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In fact, at trial, Bennett testified the trailer is somewhere in Colorado. (Tr., p.116,
Ls.15-18.)
The state charged Bennett with grand theft.

(R., pp.20-21.) The state

also filed an Information Part " alleging Bennett is a persistent violator.
pp.32-33.) After trial, a jury found Bennett guilty as charged.
p.143, Ls.3-10.)

(R.,

(R., p.46; Tr.,

After the jury returned its verdict, Bennett pled guilty to the

persistent violator allegation. (Tr., p.145, L.4-p.149, L.12.)
Bennett filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal claiming "[t]he inculpatory
evidence presented on the material element of value was so insubstantial that
jurors could not help but have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of that
element." (R., p.58.) The district court denied Bennett's motion (R., pp.65-69)
and subsequently entered judgment and imposed a unified eight-year sentence
with one and one-half years fixed for the grand theft conviction (R., pp.75-77).
The court also imposed a concurrent unified eight-year sentence with one and
one-half years fixed on the persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.76.) Bennett
filed a Rule 35 motion requesting a reduction in the indeterminate portion of his
sentence (R., pp.91-94, 109-110), which the district court denied (R., pp.111-13).
Bennett timely appealed. (R., pp.79-81, 87-89.)
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ISSUES
Bennet! states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support
the jury's verdict finding Mr. Bennet! guilty of Grand Theft?

2.

Did the district court err in ordering a separate concurrent
sentence for the persistent violator enhancement?

(Appellant's Brief, p.B.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Was there substantial competent evidence presented at trial from which
the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bennett was guilty of grand
theft?

2.

Should this Court decline to consider Bennett's illegal sentence claim
since he has failed to raise the issue in the district court?
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ARGUMENT
I.
There Was Substantial Competent Evidence Presented At Trial Upon Which The
Jurv Found Bennett Guilty Of Grand Theft

A.

Introduction
Bennett challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction, contending there was insufficient evidence presented at trial from
which a reasonable jury could have found Bennett guilty of grand theft because,
he argues, the state failed to prove (1) Bennett "took the trailer from Mr. Lefave";
(2) "Mr. LeFave had a greater ownership interest in the trailer than" Bennett; or
(3) Bennett "intended to deprive the owner or appropriate the trailer by moving it."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-8.) Bennett's argument fails. A review of the trial record
shows there was substantial competent evidence presented at trial from which
the jury reasonably found Bennett guilty of grand theft.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

State v. Knutson, 121

Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at
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1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P .2d
at 1072.

C.

There Was Substantial And Competent Evidence Presented At Trial From
Which The Jurv Reasonably Found Bennett Guilty Of Grand Theft
The state charged Bennett with grand theft in violation of I.C. §§ 18-

2403(1) and 18-2407(1)(b), alleging he "did wrongfully take 1962 [sic] travel
trailer of a value in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) lawful money of
the United States from the owner, John Lefave [sic], with the intent to deprive
another of property." (R., pp.19-20.) Idaho Code § 18-2403(1) defines theft as
follows: "A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive
another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof." An
"owner" is defined as "any person who has a right to possession thereof superior
to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder." I.C. § 18-2402(6).
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-2402(3), the intent to "deprive" another of property
means the intent "[t]o withhold [the property] or cause it to be withheld from [the
owner] permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances
that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to [the owner]" or
"[t]o dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances as to
render it unlikely that an owner will recover such property."

As repeatedly

explained by the Idaho appellate courts, "[t]he element of intent need not be
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shown by direct evidence but may be inferred from circumstantial evidence."
State v. Krommenhoek, 107 Idaho 188, 687 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1984) (Per
Curiam) (citing State v. Erwin, 98 Idaho 736, 572 P.2d 170 (1977); State v.
Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 554 P.2d 944 (1976)). As long as there is evidence from
which the jury could reasonably infer the requisite intent, the jury's verdict finding
such intent will not be disturbed.

Hart, 112 at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072;

Krommenhoek, 107 Idaho at 188, 687 P.2d at 578.
Thus, to convict Bennett of grand theft, the state was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Bennett took Mr. LeFave's trailer with the intent
to permanently deprive Mr. LeFave of the trailer and that Mr. LeFave was the
owner of the trailer. I.C. §§ 18-2402(1 )(3)(a), 18-2403(1); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,
735 P.2d at 1072. The state met its burden in this case.
Mr. LeFave testified he owned the trailer at issue and although he reached
an agreement with Bennett whereby Bennett would purchase the trailer for
$1,500.00, Bennett was not entitled to take the trailer from the location where Mr.
LeFave locked it up until he paid for the trailer. Bennett, however, without Mr.
LeFave's knowledge or consent, removed the lock from the trailer and took it to
Washington and, eventually, Colorado after making only one payment. Bennett
subsequently told Mr. LeFave that if Mr. LeFave did not send him the title,
Bennett would "burn [the trailer]." Bennett has never paid Mr. LeFave in full for
the trailer nor as he returned it to him.

This testimony, presented at trial, was

substantial and competent evidence by which the state established beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. LeFave was the owner of the trailer and that Bennett
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unlawfully took the trailer with the intent to permanently deprive Mr. LeFave of
the trailer.
Bennett, however, argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence
"on the following three elements:"
(1) that Mr. Bennett wrongfully took the property, because the
property was in Mr. Bennett's possession so it could not be
"wrongfully" taken by him; (2) that the property was taken from an
owner, because Mr. Bennett had contracted with Mr. LeFave for the
trailer and was ostensibly the owner of the trailer; and (3) that Mr.
Bennett took the property with the intent to deprive the owner of the
property or to appropriate the property, becauseMr. Bennett did not
have the requisite intent since he possessed and believed he
owned or had an ownership interest in the trailer.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) All of Bennett's arguments fail.

1.

The State Established Through Substantial And Competent
Evidence That Bennett Wrongfully Took Mr. LeFave's Trailer

Bennett's first argument, that the state failed to establish "Bennett
wrongfully took the property," is based upon the faulty premise that Bennett could
not be guilty of grand theft because the property was lawfully in his possession
when he removed the lock and took the trailer to Washington. (Appellant's Brief,
p.13.) In support of his argument, Bennett relies on the definition of "obtain" and
the opinion in State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 945 P.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997);
however, neither support his position.
Section 18-2402(4), I.C., defines "obtain" as "to bring about a transfer of
interest or possession, whether to the offender or to another." The state did not,
however, charge Bennett with unlawfully obtaining possession of the trailer.
Rather, the state charged Bennett with taking the trailer and the jury was
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instructed accordingly. (Compare R., p.21 with Instruction No. 13.) The wrongful
taking was Bennett's act of removing the trailer from Ms. Ellinger's property
without permission and without first paying for it as the parties agreed, not the
movement of the trailer to the property in the first instance, which was done with
Mr. LeFave's assistance. Bennett's reliance on the statutory definition of "obtain"
is, therefore, misplaced.
Bennett's reliance on Henninger is likewise misplaced because Henninger
is easily distinguishable. In Henninger, the defendant was charged with grand
theft by unauthorized control in violation of I.C. §18-2403(3) after he signed an
installment sale contract to purchase a vehicle and a promissory note for the
down payment but failed to make payment or retum the vehicle to the dealership.
130 Idaho at 639-40, 945 P.2d at 865-66. Theft by unauthorized control occurs
when a person "knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over, or
makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, the property of another person,
with the intent of depriving the owner thereof." I.C. § 18-2403(3).
On . appeal, the court concluded there was insufficient evidence to
establish Henninger's possession of the vehicle constituted "unauthorized
control,,2 of property he was not the "owner" of as those terms are defined in the
theft statute. Henninger, 130 Ida.ho at 640-41, 945 P .2d at 866-67. Central to
the court's decision was the determination that the legislature did not intend the
theft by unauthorized control provision of the statute "to apply where a purchaser

2 The state conceded Henninger did not exercise unauthorized control of the
vehicle when he took possession of the vehicle on the date of purchase.
Henninger, 130 Idaho at 640,945 P.2d at 866.
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in a secured credit sale has defaulted in payments and the creditor has thereby
become entitled to retake possession of the goods."

kL. at 641,

945 P .2d at 867.

Although the court acknowledged it could be "legitimately argued" based upon
the statutory definition of owner that "a party who holds only a security interest
becomes the 'owner' of the goods upon the debtor's default," the court found it
"unlikely ... that the Idaho legislature, in adopting I.C. §§ 18-2402(6) [defining
owner] and 18-2403(3), intended to render criminal the conduct of every person
who misses a payment on a secured credit purchase and does not immediately
comply with a contractual obligation to relinquish possession of the collateral to
the secured seller." Henninger, 130 Idaho at 641,945 P.2d at 867.
The court also considered "the tradition against enforcing contractual
obligations through the criminal law" in order to avoid "the improbability of
preventing

honest insolvency by threat of prosecution,

the

danger of

discouraging healthy commercial risk-tasking or of obtaining unjust convictions
by hindsight, the futility of imprisoning a debtor unable to pay, and the concept
that the seller or lender must select and accept his risks," and held that "[w]ithout
a more explicit expression of intent by the legislature to abandon this customary
separation of criminal law from civil contract enforcement," it could "not conclude
that the legislature intended unauthorized control under I.C. § 18-2403(3) to
encompass possession by a debtor who, by defaulting on one payment, has
become contractually obligated to return the collateral to the creditor, or that the
legislature intended the theft statute to be a mechanism that would aid the
repossession efforts of secured creditors." Henninger, 130 Idaho at 642, 945
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P.2d at 868, 734 (quoting State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 50, 501 P.2d 727 (1972)).
Importantly, however, the court in Henninger also stated "[I]est [its] opinion be
misunderstood," that the "Idaho legislature has provided a means to prosecute
for theft persons who obtain goods from sellers by fraud or artifice," I.C. §§ 182403(2)(a) and 18-2403(2)(d), and noted, "[b]ased upon the evidence elicited at
trial, it appears that Henninger could have been charged with theft by deception
or theft by false promise." Henninger, 130 Idaho at 642-43, 945 P.2d at 868-69.
Unlike Henninger, Bennett was not charged with theft by unauthorized
control; therefore, the court's interpretation of the legislature's intent regarding
that particular provision of the theft statute is inapplicable to this case. Even if
the broader principles discussed in Henninger are considered in the context of
this case, they do not support Bennett's argument. While the legislature may not
intend to criminalize a debtor's failure to make a single payment or assist a
secured creditor in its repossession efforts by criminalizing such conduct, those

concerns are not relevant here because the evidence presented in this case
reveals that this was not a secured transaction and Bennett did not simply fail to
default on his payment obligations - he took a trailer he was not authorized to
take. As explained in Jesser, the reasons underlying the policy against enforcing
contractual obligations

through the criminal

law "do

not apply to the

circumstances of every case involving a contract." 95 Idaho at 50, 501 P.2d at
734. Where, as here, the prosecution "is intended to deter and to punish actions
prohibited by statute," "it is a proper exercise of the criminal law."

JsL.

Indeed,

this limitation on the policy was recognized in Henninger through the court's
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conclusion that Henninger could have been found guilty of theft by means other
than those charged.

Like Henninger, Bennett was still guilty of a theft crime

regardless of the existence of a contract. And, unlike in Henninger, the state
charged Bennett under the correct provision of the theft statute and presented
substantial and competent evidence to support Bennett's conviction.

2.

The State Established Through Substantial And Competent
Evidence That Bennett Took The Trailer From An Owner

Bennett next argues the state failed to prove Mr. LeFave was the owner of
the trailer. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15.) More specifically, Bennett asserts that
when Mr. LeFave "delivered the trailer to [him] at the beginning of th[e]
transaction," "title had passed" and "[b]y accepting partial payment for the trailer
and moving the trailer to Mr. Bennett's property, Mr. LeFave was transferring
ownership of the trailer to Mr. Bennett." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Bennett relies
on a provision of the Uniform Commercial Code cited in State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho
43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972), in support of this argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1415.) Bennett's argument is without merit.
In Jesser, the defendant made arrangements to purchase barley.

The

terms of the agreement permitted Jesser to load his truck with barley and then
transport the barley to a weigh station where the load would be weighed and the
price determined based on that weight. 95 Idaho at 46, 501 P.2d at 730. Jesser,
however, transferred a portion of the barley to a different truck en route to the
weigh station such that the load he had weighed, and would be required to pay
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for, would be less than he received. kL Upon discovering Jesser's scheme,
Jesser was arrested and charged with petit larceny. kL at 47, 501 P.2d at 731.
On appeal, Jesser claimed his conduct did not constitute larceny,
"implying that it may have been obtaining property under false pretenses or
embezzlement."

Jesser, 95 Idaho at 49-50, 501 P.2d at 733-34.

The court,

therefore, analyzed whether the state charged Jesser with "the correct crime that is, whether it hard] selected the right 'label' to designate the theft." kL at 50,
501 P.2d at 734.

In conducting its analysis the court referenced the "Uniform

Commercial Code, on which the jury was instructed," in order to determine when
title passed, which was relevant to the distinction between larceny and
embezzlement. kL at 51, 501 P.2d at 735. Thus, the court's reference to the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") was contextual; nowhere in the opinion did
the court hold that the provisions of the UCC apply to a criminal case.

And,

unlike Jesser, the jury in this case was not instructed on the UCC title provision
discussed in that case. In fact, instructing the jury on the UCC title provision in
this case would have been improper because the title provisions applicable to
vehicles are found in I.C. § 49-501, et seq., not the UCC. Specifically, I.C. § 49503 provides:
Except as provided in sections 49-502,49-510 through 49-512, and
49-514, Idaho Code, no person acquiring a vehicle from the owner,
whether the owner is a dealer or otherwise, shall acquire any right,
title, claim or interest in or to the vehicle until he has issued to him a
certificate of title to that vehicle, nor shall any waiver or estoppel
operate in favor of that person against a person having possession
of a certificate of title or an aSSignment of the certificate of the
vehicle for a valuable consideration.
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Thus, contrary to Bennett's assertion, "ownership" did not transfer to him merely
because LeFave accepted a single payment and moved the trailer to Ms.
Ellinger's property.
Even if the UCC provision cited in Jesser were relevant to the sufficiency
of the evidence issue presented in this case, Bennett's reliance on it is misplaced
because the provision cited, I.C. § 28-2-401(2), states "title passes to the buyer
at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with
reference to the physical delivery of the goods" "[u]nless otherwise explicitly
agreed." (Emphasis added.) Mr. LeFave testified Bennett was not entitled to

take the trailer until it was paid for, therefore, title did not pass to Bennett simply
because Mr. LeFave moved the trailer to Ms. Ellinger's property. Bennett cites
no other authority for the proposition that Mr. LeFave "transferr[ed] ownership of
the trailer" to Bennett "[b]y accepting partial payment for the trailer and moving
the trailer to Mr. Bennett's property.,,3 (Appellant's Brief, p.15.)
In determining who was the "owner" of the trailer, there is no need to
reference the UCC provisions relating to title.

Rather, the Court need look no

further then the definitions provided in the theft statute, which define "owner" as '
"any person who has a rig ht to possession thereof superior to that of the taker,
obtainer or withholder." I.C. § 18-2402(6). Mr. LeFave's testimony that, under
the terms of the agreement, Bennett was not entitled to remove the trailer from
Ms. Ellinger's property until the trailer was paid for was substantial and

The state notes that, contrary to Bennett's assertion, the property to which Mr.
LeF ave transferred the trailer was not "Mr. Bennett's property" (Appellant's Brief,
p.15); the property belonged to Ms. Ellinger (Tr., p.82, Ls.16-19).

3
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competent evidence that Mr. LeFave had a superior right to possess the trailer
and, as such, was the "owner" of the trailer.

Because Bennett has failed to

establish otherwise, his claim that the state failed to meet its burden on this
element fails.

3.

The State Established Through Substantial And Competent
Evidence That Bennett Took The Trailer With The Intent To
Permanently Deprive Mr. LeFave Of The Trailer

Bennett next argues the state failed to satisfy its burden of establishing
Bennett took Mr. LeFave's trailer with the intent to permanently deprive.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-17.) Bennett's argument is based upon his erroneous
belief that he "had lawful possession of the trailer and was the owner." For the
reasons set forth supra, these arguments fail.
The state presented substantial and competent evidence that when
Bennett took the trailer from Ms. Ellinger's property, Bennett intended to
permanently deprive Mr. LeFave of the trailer - a point best illustrated by
Bennett's own threat to "bum [the trailer]" if Mr. LeFave did not send him the title
and Bennett's failure to, at any point, return the trailer to Mr. LeFave. From this
evidence the jury could, and did, reasonably infer that Bennett took Mr. LeFave's
trailer with the intent to permanently deprive.
Construing the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
facts in favor of upholding the jury's verdict, the evidence presented at trial
supports the jury's finding that Bennett was guilty of grand theft.
conviction must therefore be affirmed.
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Bennett's

II.
Bennett's Argument That His Sentence Is Illegal Is Not Preserved For Appeal
Bennett claims his sentence is illegal because the persistent violator
enhancement, to which Bennett pled guilty, could only be used to enhance his
sentence on the grand theft conviction, but the district court instead erroneously
imposed a separate, concurrent sentence for the enhancement.
Brief, pp.17-18.)

(Appellant's

Bennett has failed to preserve this argument for appeal

because he never presented the issue to the district court. As explained in State
v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 896, 55 P.3d 890, 903 (Ct. App. 2002):
The appropriate method to obtain clarification of sentences is to
request such clarification from the court that imposed them.
Hoffman has not done this. A claim of an illegal sentence is not an
issue that may be presented for the first time on appeal, State v.
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1023,842 P.2d 698, 702 (Ct.App.1992),
and it was not necessary for Hoffman to include this issue in his
appeal in order to bring it to the district court on remand. Should
Hoffman wish to bring this question to the district court, he may yet
do so under Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
Because this appeal is not "[t]he appropriate method to obtain clarification"
of his sentence, Bennett is not entitled to appellate relief in relation to his
sentence.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Bennett's conviction for grand theft.
DATED this 5th day of June 2008.

JE SAM. LORELLO
Dep y Attomey General
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